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I. INTRODUCTION
All too often, a criminal defendant is faced with an overzealous
prosecutor devoted to winning at all costs. This "win at all costs" mind-set
can lead to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and continues
to be a basis for reversing numerous convictions in Florida.
1
1. See Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629, 643-46 (Fla. 1997)(reversing death sentence and
remanding for resentencing based on that prosecutor's continued use of redacted statements of
the co-defendant against Smith); DeFreitas v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2462, D2465-66 (4th
Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1997)(reversing because that prosecutor impermissibly asked the jurors
to place themselves in the position of the victims and asked them to think how they would feel
if the crime happened to them, and because the prosecutor impermissbly compared the
defendant's case and the O.J. Simpson case); McLellan v. State, 696 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor bolstered witness' testimony by saying
patients give honest histories to their doctor, and thus, commented on facts outside the
evidence, because the doctor in question did not testify); Walker v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly
D1543, D1543 (5th Dist. Ct. App. June 27, 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor's
comment: "The defendant in order to claim entrapment had to say 'if it wasn't for the action
of the government, I would not have even thought or tried to do what I did,"' was fairly
susceptible to being interpreted as a comment on the defendant's right to remain silent); Fryer
v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor
repeatedly expressed his personal opinion of the veracity of a police officer, and stated that
defense counsel 'knew' his client was guilty); Jackson v. State, 690 So. 2d 714, 718 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor argued that the defendant was guilty of
a crime greater than the one for which he was tried); Perez v. State, 689 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (reversing for interecting accusations of racism which were not
justified by the evidence or relevant to the issues); D'Annunzio v. State, 683 So. 2d 151, 153
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing because the prosecutor argued the defendant failed to
produce alibi witness although there was no evidence of the identity of the witness or whether
the witness knew material facts); Baldez v. State, 679 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)(holding "it is improper for a prosecutor to comment on the defendant's demeanor when
the defendant is not on the witness stand"); Raupp v. State, 678 So. 2d 1358, 1361 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing because the prosecutor insinuated that there were missing
witnesses who had information, and the defendant had secreted those witnesses); Cisneros v.
State, 678 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing because the prosecutor
argued that the police officer was "not the type of man that would come in here and violate
that sacred oath.")(emphasis omitted); Northard v. State, 675 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1996)(finding the prosecutor's argument improper because it asked the jury to
determine who was lying as the test for deciding guilt); Williams v. State, 673 So. 2d 974, 975
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing for the prosecutor's attempt to bolster the credibility
of police officers); Knight v. State, 672 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)(reversing because the prosecutor attacked the credibility of defense counsel, resorted to
personal attacks on defense counsel, argued facts not in evidence, and commented on the
defendant's right to remain silent); Willis v. State, 669 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)(finding that the prosecutor's attack on the credibility of an alibi witness on the
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Although prosecutorial misconduct may occur prior to or during the trial
of a criminal case, such as during the discovery period,2 during examination
of witnesses,3 or during opening statement,4 this note will be strictly limited to
a discussion of prosecutorial misconduct which occurs during closing
argument, and will focus on Florida case law.
This note is divided into nine parts. Following the Introduction, Part II
will briefly define the purpose of closing argument, and Part III will examine
the prosecutor's duty. Part IV will address a variety of improper comments
made during closing argument. Part V will review the "Invited Response" or
"Fair Reply Rule," Part VI will discuss the "Harmless Error Doctrine," 6 and
Part VII will discuss preserving the issue for appeal. Part VIII will briefly
address a disciplinary action through The Florida Bar, and Part IX will
conclude that reversal of convictions has failed to deter prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument, and that the issue is deserving of closer
attention by Florida trial courts.
basis that the witness was not listed until four months after the defendant's arrest was
improper).
2. See McArthur v. State, 671 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing
where the state provided inaccurate and misleading information concerning the test results of
victim's clothing).
3. See Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)(reversing
because ihe prosecutor asked a witness whether the prior witnesses had lied).
4. See Northard v. State, 675 So. 2d 652, 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing
in part because the prosecutor's comment during opening statement that the jury would return
"a verdict that simply reflects the truth; that the defendant in this case was caught red-
handed," could have resulted in the jury voting to convict because they believed the defendant
had committed the crime, even if the state had not met its burden of proof).
5. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1985)(explaining when defense
counsel argues improperly and provokes the prosecutor to respond, the court will weigh the
impact of the prosecutor's remarks, and take into account defense counsel's opening salvo).
6. Section 59.041 of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part:
No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted by any court
of the state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of
the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence or for error as to
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to
which application is made, after an examination of the entire case it shall
appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
This section shall be liberally construed.
FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1995).
Tobin
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II. CLOSING ARGUMENT
Perhaps the most exciting and dramatic part of a criminal trial is closing
argument, because it affords the attorneys the final opportunity "to argue the
facts in evidence and/or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.,
7
However, it is also at this point in the proceedings that a prosecutor may have
become so devoted to winning the case for the victim, or for the citizens of the
State of Florida, that his or her emotions intrude and result in a "win at all
costs" closing argument not based on the facts brought out during trial. For
this reason, it is important to keep in mind the purpose of closing argument.
In Bertolotti v. State,8 the Supreme Court of Florida stated the purpose of
closing argument:
The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence
and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence. Conversely, it must not be used to inflame the
minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an
emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the
logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.
9
More recently, in Terry v. State,10 the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned that
"[t]he purpose of closing argument is to help the jury understand the issues by
applying the evidence to the law. Thus, the purpose of closinp argument is
disserved when comment upon irrelevant matters is permitted."'
I1. THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY
The prosecutor's duty has been addressed in numerous Florida appellate
cases. More than sixty years ago in Roach v. State,12 the Supreme Court of
Florida noted that "[a prosecutor] occupies a semijudicial position. . with no
greater duty imposed on him than to preserve intact all the great sanctions and
7. Willis v. State, 669 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(citing Jones v.
State, 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992); Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Bertolotti
v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985)).
8. 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985).
9. Id. at 134. See also Weiand v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1707, 1708 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. July 11, 1997); Hightower v. State, 592 So. 2d 689, 693 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(Gersten, J., dissenting); Jackson v. State, 522 So. 2d 802, 809 (Fla. 1988); Rosso v. State,
505 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
10. 668 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1996).
11. Id. at 963.
12. 146 So. 240 (Fla. 1933).
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traditions of the law.' 3 Thirty-three years later, in Adams v. State,14 the
Supreme Court of Florida added that "attorneys for the State should refrain
from inflammatory and abusive argument, since they are officers clothed with
quasi-judicial powers."15
In Tribue v. State,'6 the Second District Court of Appeal stated a
prosecutor has a duty to refrain from making improper comments that may
tend to affect the fairness and impartiality of the trial, 17 and as expressed by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, it is the duty of a prosecutor "to be fair,
honorable and just."' 8 With regard to fairness of opposing party and counsel,
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar'9 provide a lawyer shall not:
[I]n trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness
of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil
litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
20
The First District Court of Appeal in Cochran v. State,2' held that "[i]t is
the duty of a prosecuting attorney in a trial to refrain from making improper
remarks or committing acts which would or might tend to affect the fairness
and impartiality to which the accused is entitled.,
22
13. Id. at 240. See also Young v. State, 195 So. 569 (Fla. 1939).
14. 192 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1966).
15. Id. at 764-65.
16. 106 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
17. Id. at 633. See also Mack v. State, 461 So. 2d 142, 143-144 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Wilder v.
State, 355 So. 2d 188, 189-90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(Boyer, J., dissenting); Kirk v.
State, 227 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
18. Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
19. FLA. RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-3.4. Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct are found in chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
20. Id. at 4-3.4(e).
21. 280 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
22, Id. at 43. See also Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d (Fla. 1976); Briggs v. State, 455 So.
2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Hufham v. State, 400 So. 2d 133, 136 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Davis v. State, 397 So. 2d 1005, 1008 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 126, 128 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Knight v. State, 316 So.
2d 576, 578-79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Tobin
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In Kirk v. State,23 the prosecutor read off a list of defense witnesses who
did not testify, and asked the jury where those people were. 24 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal held the prosecutor's closing argument was
prejudicial and required a new trial. The court noted a prosecutor has a
greater responsibility than defense counsel, 25 and explained:
The prosecuting attorney in a criminal case has an even greater
responsibility than counsel for an individual client. For the
purpose of the individual case he represents the great authority of
the State of Florida. His duty is not to obtain convictions but to
seek justice, and he must exercise that responsibility with the
circumspection and dignity the occasion calls for.
26
IV. FOUL BLOWS
In Berger v. United States,2 7 Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court and stated:
The [prosecuting] Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.28
23. 227 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
24. Id. at 42.
25. Id. at 43.
26. Id. See also Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287, 295 (Fla. 1976)(Sundberg, J.,
dissenting); Sandoval v. State, 689 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Mack v.
State, 461 So. 2d 142, 143-144 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Mulford v. State, 416 So. 2d
1199, 1201-02 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Peterson v. State, Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d
1230, 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Cochran v. State, 280 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1973).
27. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
28. Id. at 88 (emphasis added); see also Craig v. State, 685 So. 2d 1224, 1229 (Fla.
1996); Hampton v. State, 680 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Boatwright v.
490 [Vol. 22:485
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Despite the Court's condemnation of improper argument, the issue continues
to arise in Florida appellate courts. Numerous examples of "foul blows"
struck by prosecutors during closing argument are discussed below.
A. Commenting on Defendant's Right to Remain Silent
All prosecutors are aware they are prohibited from commenting on a
defendant's right to remain silent.29 In the first half of 1997, Florida courts
held that many comments made by prosecutors during closing argument were
fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the
defendant's failure to testify.30 Additionally, as noted by the Supreme Court
of Florida in State v. DiGuilio,31 comments on a defendant's failure to testify
can be of an "almost unlimited variety. 32
During trial in Davis v. State,33 the prosecutor commented on the lack of
an identification defense, and stated: "Well, I didn't hear that from either of
these Defendants." 34 Although the case was reversed on other grounds, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal warned that the comment should not be
repeated at the new trial because it was "fairly susceptible of being interpreted
, ,,35
by the jury as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. While in
Knight v. State,36  the prosecutor made numerous references to
"uncontradicted testimony"37 of the police officers, and stated "God forbid
you should believe a police officer whose testimony went uncontradicted by
these Defendants who told you specifically what happened in this case."
38
State, 452 So. 2d 666, 667-78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Rolle v. State, 268 So. 2d 541,
542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Marsh v. State, 202 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
29. See J. Allison DeFoor II & Randolph Braccialarghe, Florida Reverses its Per Se
Reversal Rule on Improper Prosecutorial Comment on a Defendant's Rights to Remain Silent,
13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1119, 1122 (1986).
30. See Walker v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1543, D1544 (5th Dist. Ct. App. June 27,
1997)(reversing because the prosecutor argued that the defendant was not entitled to an
entrapment defense because he had remained silent); Dean v. State, 690 So. 2d 720, 724 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor argued that the defendant had failed
to explain why he used an assumed name and failed to produce identification).
31. 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
32. Id. at 1135-36.
33. 683 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
34. Id. at 575 n.1.
35. Id. at 574-75.
36. 672 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
37. Id. at 591.
38. Id.
1997]
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted none of the comments were
invited, and held the prosecutor's remarks were improper and commented on
the defendant's right to remain silent.
39
Recently, in Dean v. State,4 0 the prosecutor told the jury that they had not
heard a reasonable explanation for the defendant using an assumed name and
failing to produce identification n.4  The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed and found the prosecutor's comments to be "particularly egregious,"
because the only person who could have given that testimony was the
defendant himself.
42
However, not all similar comments have been held improper. For
example, in Priestly v. State,43 the prosecutor remarked during closing
argument that the defendants raising an entrapment defense would "have to
show or has to be shown through evidence to you-in other words, through
the State's presentation of evidence to you that they were entrapped.""44 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal held the remarks merely called the jury's
attention to the rule that the defense must prove the affirmative defense of
entrapment, unless the State's case itself shows entrapment.45 Therefore, the
comments were proper and not violative of the defendant's right to remain
silent.n6
In Walker v. State,n7 the prosecutor stated: "The defendant in order to
claim entrapment had to say 'if it wasn't for the action of the government, I
would not have even thought or tried to do what I did.'4 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal held the remark to be an improper comment on the
defendant's right to remain silent,4 9 and noted, "Florida's courts have guarded
against juries considering even the slightest suggestion that a defendant's
failure to take the stand on his own behalf is evidence of guilt."50 The fifth
district found the remarks were not harmless error and reversed. 51
Finally, in Spry v. State,52 the defendant did not take the stand. The
prosecuting attorney, referring to a scene from the movie "Guide to the
39. Id.
40. 690 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
41. Id. at 724.
42. Id.
43. 450 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
44. Id. at 292.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1543 (5th Dist. Ct. App. June 27, 1997).
48. Id. at D1543.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at D1544.
52. 664 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Married Man," in which one character advised another that even if he got
caught in an act of infidelity '[o]ne of the rules of the game, always deny it
-never admit anything... even if you get caught in the act."' 53 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal stated: "We would think that the fact that we have
been compelled to reverse so many convictions because of improper
comments on silence would result in prosecutors getting the message, yet they
seem to keep coming up with arguments which can have a double meaning,
and thus risk error.",54 Apparently, many prosecutors have yet to read Spry.
B. Exhorting the Jury to "Do Its Job" and Convict
In United States v. Young,55 the prosecutor argued:
I don't know whether you call it honor and integrity, I don't call it
that, [defense counsel] does. If you feel you should acquit him for
that it's your pleasure. I don't think you're doing your job as jurors
in finding facts as opposed to the law that this Judge is going to
instruct you, you think that's honor and integrity then stand up here
in Oklahoma courtroom and say that's honor and integrity; I don't
believe it.56
Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court and stated: "The prosecutor was also in error to try to exhort the jury to
'do its job'; that kind of pressure, whether by the prosecutor or defense
counsel, has no place in the administration of criminal justice."" However,
the court concluded the jury was not influenced by the improper remarks.58
A variety of improper comments were made by the prosecutor in Ryan v.
State.59 The prosecutor asked the jury not to set the defendant free into the
community not only because she lied, but because she was rich and would
"thumb her nose at small Martin County and say, 'Well, we really pulled one
over those guys."' 60 The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted "[a]rguments
53. Id. at 41.
54. Id. at 41-42.
55. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
56. Id. at 5-6.
57. Id. at 18.
58. Id.
59. 457 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
60. Id. at 1088.
Tobin
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which beseech the jury to convict a defendant for any reason except guilt are
highly prejudicial and are strongly discouraged.'
A similar holding was made by the First District Court of Appeal in
Pacifico v. State. In Pacifico, the prosecutor commented "[i]f the defendant
walks out of here a free man today, that's your decision," and, "[n]ow, does
he walk out of this courtroom today laughing, or do you make him take
responsibility for what he did to [victim] that night?, 63 The first district held
the comments were improper and, when considered together, "appears to
constitute an implicit instruction to the jurors that it was their duty to society
to return a verdict of guilty, a practice deemed to be reversible error."
64
C. Personal Attacks on Defense Counsel
Without question, the vast majority of criminal prosecutions are
competently and ethically tried by the prosecuting attorneys of this state. Too
often, however, a prosecuting attorney succumbs to the temptation of putting
the defense counsel on trial rather than the issues. "This temptation must be
resisted completely in every case. 65 In Westley v. State,66 although the First
District Court of Appeal found the prosecutor's remarks were not a personal
attack on defense counsel, the court warned "the prosecutor's indulgence in
improper argument is a perilous practice."
67
In Adams v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida stated prosecutors are
not permitted to make references in closing argument to defense counsel
"which are so extreme and of such a nature that they could be prejudicial" to
the trial of the accused.69 In Briggs v. State,7° the prosecutor questioned the
personal integrity of defense counsel by suggesting defense counsel had not
been truthful and had deliberately mislead the jury. 1 The First District Court
of Appeal held "[v]erbal attacks on the personal integrity of opposing counsel,
rather than appropriate comments on the credibility of witnesses and
61. Id. at 1089.
62. 642 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 1182.
64. Id. at 1182-83.
65. Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 522 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
66. 416 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
67. Id. at 20.
68. 192 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1966).
69. Id. at 764 (where the prosecutor said "[i]et me just show you what perverted and
distorted things a lawyer can do when he wants to do it").
70. 455 So. 2d 519 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
71. Id. at 520.
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inferences to be drawn from the evidence before the jury, are wholly
inconsistent with the prosecutor's role."
72
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has strongly disapproved of these
comments. In Landry v. State,73 when the prosecutor attempted to denigrate
defense counsel by arguing the defense had "conjured up" a witness,7 the
fourth district held that the comment was highly improper. Verbal attacks on
defense counsel can "poison the minds of the jury,"76 and attacks on the
personal integrity of defense counsel are "utterly and grossly improper.' 77
Prosecutors continue to launch personal attacks on defense lawyers and
exceed the bounds of proper argument. In many cases, the state's closing
argument may cause one to wonder who is on trial, the defendant or the
defense counsel.78
72. Id. at 521.
73. 620 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
74. Id. at 1101.
75. Id.
76. Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
77. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
78. See Knight v. State, 672 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(where
prosecutor attacked the credibility of defense counsel for objecting to the state's introduction
of inadmissible evidence); Landry v. State, 620 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993)(where prosecutor suggested the defense conjured up a witness or, in other words, was
presenting false testimony); Valdez v. State, 613 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993)(where prosecutor argued the defense failed to give the jury an accurate story); Alvarez
v. State, 574 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)(where prosecutor stated: "So, if
you are nitpicking and trying to insult somebody's intelligence, as the defense is really doing
today")(emphasis omitted); Huff v. State, 544 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989)(where prosecutor opined the defense was a fabrication); Waters v. State, 486 So. 2d
614, 616 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(where prosecutor repeatedly characterized defense
counsel's argument as a "smoke screen"); Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984)(where prosecutor referred to defense counsel as a fancy lawyer from a big city,
and accused him of not being totally honest with the jury); Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519,
520 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)(where prosecutor suggested defense counsel "was not being
truthful and was deliberately misleading the jury"); Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 15-16 n.
I (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(where prosecutor asked, "[w]ould you buy a used car from this
guy, ladies and gentlemen of the jury?")(emphasis omitted); Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d
1230, 1233 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979)(where prosecutor stated "not only do they have to
get into these disguises and crawl down there and deal with people like this, but they have to
deal with people like his lawyer"); Carter v. State, 356 So. 2d 67, 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (where prosecutor argued defense counsel was trying to "distort the evidence" and
mislead the jury); Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1966)(where prosecutor said
defense counsel's statements perverted and distorted things, and violated his oath as a lawyer);
1997]
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D. Calling the Defendant a Liar
In O'Callaghan v. State,79 during the defendant's trial testimony about
his presence at the crime scene, the prosecutor stated: "That's a lie. I would
like to go to the bench., 80 In response, the Supreme Court of Florida stated it
is "unquestionably improper" for a prosecutor to assert that the defendant has
lied.8' "Any trial lawyer should know that this type of conduct is completelyS,,82
beyond the limits of propriety. However, the remarks did not warrant a
reversal of the conviction.
This year, in Washington v. State,84 the defendant denied the accusations
of sexual battery and sexual activity with a minor and the prosecutor, in
addressing the defendant's testimony, stated:
Joseph Goebbels, who was a propaganda minister for Germany
back at the time of Adolf Hitler, had a theory. He believed that you
should lie to the people but that you shouldn't lie with small lies
because you can get caught in small lies. What you should do is
you should lie big, come up with a big lie because that's something
that you might be able to have the people buy is the big lie. Of
course, at that time it was that the Jews were responsible for
everything that was wrong in the world and they should be
exterminated. Well, the defense in this case is nothing but a big
lie.85
The Second District Court of Appeal in Washington stated: "[I]t is difficult
for us to perceive a more egregious and prejudicial statement,'' , and held "[i]t
is 'unquestionably improper' for a prosecutor to state that the defendant has
lied ... it constitutes an improper statement of opinion by the prosecutor.
87
The second district concluded it had "no choice but to reverse Washington's
judgment and sentence., 88
Douglass v. State, 184 So. 756, 757 (Fla. 1938)(where, in a prosecution for incest, the
prosecutor suggested that defense counsel was also guilty of incest).
79. 429 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1983).
80. Id. at 696.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 687 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
85. Id. at 280.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing O'Callaghan v. State, 429 So.2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1983)).
88. Id.
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In Bass v. State,89 the prosecutor told the jury "[i]f you want to tell
Jimmy Wayne Bass he lied, there is only one verdict, guilty. The man is
guilty."90 The First District Court of Appeal concluded the prosecutor's
remarks "could have been and were likely construed by the jury as directing
them to 'send a message' about lying in the courtroom rather than focusing
their attention on whether the state had proven Bass' guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." 91
A similar comment was made by the prosecutor in Jones v. State.92 The
Jones prosecutor did not mince words when he said: "What about Tyrone
Jones? I submit, that when Tyrone Jones took the stand, he lied to
you..... ..93 The First District Court of Appeal reversed because of the
"improper comments and argument and the state's tenuous case against
Jones . ... 2,94 However, in Brown v. State,95 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held "[i]t is clearly not improper for either counsel in closing
argument to characterize specific witnesses as liars, so long as counsel relates
the argument solely to the testimony of the witnesses and evidence in the
record.
, 96
E. Commenting on Defendant's Demeanor
The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed a comment concerning, 97
the defendant's demeanor in Baldez v. State. In Baldez, the prosecutor said
the defendant was "glaring" at the witness while the witness was on the
stand.98  The fourth district stated: "It is improper for a prosecutor to
comment on the defendant's demeanor when he is not on the witness
stand." 99 The court also held the prosecutor used the defendant's demeanor to
bolster the credibility of the witnesses by suggesting they were truthful simply
because they testified in the face of intimidation. 
°°
89. 547 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
90. Id. at 682 (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. at 682-83.
92. 449 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
93. Id. at314.
94. Id. at 315.
95. 678 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
96. Id. at 912.
97. 679 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
98. Id. at 826.
99. Id. (citing Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1986)).
100. Id. at 827.
1997]
13
Tobin: Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Argument: Florida Case La
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
A similar argument was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. In
Pope v. Wainwright,l0' the prosecutor stated: "I don't know if you saw it; but
I saw it, [Pope] was grinning from ear-to-ear. This is supposed to be a
wrongful accused man, grinning from ear-to-ear? I don't know why he grins
from ear-to-ear."' 0 2 In Pope, the court held the prosecutor's comments were
clearly improper, but were not reviewable on appeal because of the
defendant's failure to object and move for a mistrial.'0
F. Bolstering the Credibility of Police Officers
In Fryer v. State,10 4 the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of an
officer at least six times. 0 5 The Third District Court of Appeal held the
prosecutor's remarks were "patently improper and violative of the rules of
professional conduct,"' 06  and concluded the "prosecutor's remarks
compromised the jury's ability to fairly evaluate the evidence and, in turn,
Fryer's right to a fair trial.',
10 7
In Cisneros v. State, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained the
reasons why attempting to bolster the credibility of a police officer is
improper:1
0 8
First, although such comments may not in some instances constitute
an affirmative statement of the prosecutor's personal belief in the
veracity of the police officer, they do constitute an inappropriate
attempt to persuade the jury that the police officer's testimony
should be believed simply because the witness is a police officer.
Second, such comments make reference to matters outside the
record and constituted impermissible bolstering of the police
officer's testimony.10 9
The fourth district's explanation was brought about by the prosecutor's
closing argument in Cisneros, wherein he made numerous statements about
101. 496 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1986).
102. Id. at 802.
103. Id.
104. 693 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
105. Id. at 1047.
106. Id. at 1047-48(citing Cisneros v. State, 678 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Davis v. State, 663 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ramos, 579 So.
2d 360 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Singletary v. State, 483 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); FLA. RULEs OF PROFEssIONAL CONDuCT 4-3.4(e)).
107. Id. at 1048.
108. 678 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
109. Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
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the police officer's credibility: "To win a case he jeopardizes his career, to
win a case he's going to put someone in jail?... He's not the man to come
in here and violate that oath."' 10
Similarly, in Williams v. State,"' the prosecutor stated: "I submit to you
that it's not reasonable to consider that sworn police officers, doing their job,
could come into court and perjure themselves."' 1 2  The court found the
comment improper and stated: "An attempt by the prosecuting attorney to
bolster the credibility of police officers testifying in the case is improper
argument entitling the defendant to a new trial."
'' 13
This type of improper argument is no stranger to the Fourth District
Court of Appeal. In Davis v. State,'1 4 the court condemned the prosecutor's
argument when he remarked:
The Judge is also going to tell you that you have the right to
determine or to evaluate somebody's testimony by what they have
to gain from it .... What does Officer Hadden and Officer Kahir
have to gain by putting their careers in jeopardy, taking the stand
and perjuring themselves?" 5
In Clark v. State,1 6 the Fourth District Court of Appeal condemned an
argument almost identical to the prosecutor's argument in Davis, and
concluded "[i]n no uncertain terms, the prosecutor's argument was that police
officers would not testify falsely because they have too much at stake and
would not risk their jobs."'1 7 Further, in Landry v. State, a case replete with
improper comments, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
conviction and sentence because of the prosecutor's improper closing
argument During closing argument, the Landry prosecutor referred to the
110. Id. at 889 (emphasis omitted).
111. 673 So. 2d 974 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
112. Id. at 975.
113. Id. (citing Robinson v. State, 637 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Clark
v. State, 632 So. 2d 88, 91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
114. 663 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1995).
115. Id. at 1380 (emphasis omitted).
116. 632 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Id. at 91.
118. 620 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The Landry prosecutor was
previously chastised in Klepak v. State, 622 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In
Klepak the prosecutor argued to the court that the jury was "made up of buffoons" and
"lobotomized zombies" and suggested that their verdict was returned because they were
"eating pizza or salads instead of deliberating." Id. at 20. Further, the prosecutor said this
jury is "a classic reason I don't believe in the jury system." Id. Presently pending is another
1997] 499
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"unblemished record"' 19 of the police officers several times. The fourth
district found the prosecutor's claim was unsupported by the record and
"constituted impermissible bolstering of the officers' testimony."'120
G. Sending a Message to the Community
The Supreme Court of Florida has stated that urging the jury to consider
the message its verdict would send to the community at large is "an obvious
appeal to the emotions and fears of the jurors.'' In Boatwright v. State, 2
the prosecutor stated: "I'm asking you to do your job today, here in this
courtroom and send these folks a message .... This is our country, this is our
nation, it's time to send 'em-send criminals a message we're not gonna
tolerate it any more .. ,,1 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
"[t]he 'send 'em a message' argument may have some cachet in the political
arena, but it is grossly improper in a court of law. It diverts the jury's
attention from the task at hand and worse, prompts the jury to consider
matters extraneous to the evidence.'
2 4
Last year, in Campbell v. State,125 the Supreme Court of Florida
reiterated its holding in Bertolotti: "'Message to the community' arguments
are impermissible-they are 'an obvious appeal to the emotions and fears of
the jurors.' These considerations are outside the scope of the jury's
deliberation and their injection violates the prosecutor's duty to seek
justice .... ,126 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed Campbell "due to
improper conduct by the prosecutor,"'127 and warned:
[W]e are deeply disturbed as a Court by continuing violations of
prosecutorial duty, propriety and restraint. We have recently
addressed incidents of prosecutorial misconduct in several death
penalty cases. As a Court, we are constitutionally charged not only
with appellate review but also "to regulate... the discipline of
appeal involving the same prosecutor wherein one of the issues on appeal is whether "THE
PROSECUTOR COMMITTED INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT BY VIRTUE OF HIS
CLOSING ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY." Brief for Appellant at 29, Cochran v. State, No.
97-00189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. filed June 23, 1997).
119. Landry, 620 So. 2d at 1 101.
120. Id.
121. Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985).
122. 452 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
123. Id. at 667.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. 679 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1996).
126. Id. at 724 (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985)).
127. Id. at 726.
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persons admitted" to the practice of law. This Court considers this
sort of prosecutorial misconduct.., to be grounds for appropriate
disciplinary proceedings. It ill becomes those who represent the
state in the application of its lawful penalties to themselves ignore
the precepts of their profession and their office.
128
H. Appeals to Sympathy, Bias, Passion or Prejudice
The Supreme Court of Florida has addressed a prosecutor's appeal to
sympathy, bias, passion, or prejudice on several occasions. In King v.
State,129 the prosecutor mentioned during opening and closing arguments that
the victim was a mother.130 The Supreme Court of Florida concluded the
comments did not affect the verdict and were harmless error.13 1 However, in
regards to additional remarks made during closing argument of the penalty
phase, the court stated: "if 'comments in closing argument are intended to and
do inject elements of emotion and fear into the jury's deliberations, a
prosecutor has ventured far outside the scope of proper argument.""' 132 The
court ordered a new sentencing proceeding before ajury' 33
In Rhodes v. State,134 at the conclusion of the prosecutor's closing
argument, he urged the jury to "show Rhodes the same mercy shown to the
victim on the day of her death.', 135 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed
and found the "argument was an unnecessary appeal to the sympathies of the
jurors, calculated to influence their sentence recommendation. ' 136
The Third District Court of Appeal also addressed the issue in Edwards
v. State,137 where the prosecutor argued to the jury, "[a]ll I'm going to ask you
for is justice. I ask you for justice both on behalf of myself and the people of
the State of Florida, also on behalf of [victim's] wife and children.' 3 8 The
court held "[t]he prosecutor's argument was an improper appeal to the jury for
128. Id. at 725 (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985)). See also
Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993); Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 1990).
129. 623 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993).
130. Id. at 488 n.1.
131. Id. at 488.
132. Id. (quoting Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988)).
133. Id. at 488-89.
134. 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989).
135. Id. at 1206.
136. Id.
137. 428 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
138. Id. at 359 (emphasis omitted).
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sympathy for the wife and children of the victim, the natural effect of which
would be hostile emotions toward the accused.,
139
I. Miscellaneous Comments
1. Referring to the Defendant as a Criminal
In Pacifico v. State, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted "a
prosecutor may use a defendant's prior conviction as an impeachment tool,
but it is improper to refer to the defendant's previous convictions for the
purpose of indicating that he or she has a propensity to commit crime."'140 At
trial, the prosecutor argued to the jury "[t]his defendant is a criminal, and he
needs to be convicted.'' Moreover, it is improper to imply that a defendant
has committed other crimes, or that the defendant may commit a future
crime. 142 It is also improper to comment on prior felonies and to state what
they were for when the defendant correctly admitted the number of his felony
convictions. 1
43
2. Commenting About When a Defense Witness Was Listed
In Willis v. State,144 the prosecuting attorney "suggested that one of
Willis' alibi witnesses was not to be believed because the witness was not
immediately listed on the defense's pretrial witness list. ' 145  The Third
District Court of Appeal held that it was improper to attack the credibility of
an alibi witness merely because that witness was not listed until four months
after the defendant was arrested. 146 The court noted "the decision of whether
or when to list a particular witness on a pretrial witness list is beyond the
control of the witness.'
147
139. Id.
140. 642 So. 2d 1178, 1183 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Davis v. State, 397
So. 2d 1005, 1008 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
141. Id.
142. Gleason v. State, 591 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
143. Gavins v. State, 587 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
144. 669 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
145. Id. at 1091.
146. Id. at 1094.
147. Id.
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3. Commenting on the Role of the Jury
In Landry v. State the prosecutor argued to the jury: "'[Y]ou took the
oath whether you like the law or not. And, you know, when you're asked
about your decision here being final, our system is huge. You have appellate
courts, you have the supreme court."' 48 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
agreed those remarks suggested to the jury that their role was only an advisory
one, because it would be reviewed by appellate courts.
149
4. Currying Favor with the Jury
Additionally, in Landry v. State the prosecutor made references to his
military service in the Persian Gulf.1?° The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that although such a comment alone was not reversible error, it was an
improper attempt to "curry favor with the jury .... . 151 The court noted this is
especially true where the comment "is entirely irrelevant to any issue being
tried or argued.152 The fourth district reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
153
5. Personal Belief of the Prosecutor
In Jones v. State, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that it is
improper and inappropriate for a prosecutor to express a personal belief in the
guilt of the accused, or in the veracity of the state's witnesses. 15 The fifth
district concluded that the combined effect "of the prosecutor's improper
comments and argument and the state's tenuous case against Jones convinces
us that on balance Jones did not receive a fair and impartial trial ....", In
Jones, "the prosecutor alluded to or stated his personal beliefs in Jones' guilt
and the veracity of the state's witnesses ....". Over thirty years ago, the
Supreme Court of Florida addressed such comments:
148. 620 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 4kh Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Landry, 620 So. 2d at 1103.
154. 449 So. 2d 313, 314-15 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
155. Id. at315.
156. Id. at314.
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It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the sound rule of practice that the
prosecution will not in argument express belief in the guilt of the
defendant 57 and will not make inflammatory reference to the
victim's family. 58 Competent counsel avoid such breaches of legal
propriety and the courts will scrutinize such offensive conduct with
great care. 1
59
6. Asking the Jury to Determine Who Is Lying
Last year, in Northard v. State, 60 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
found the prosecutor's closing argument1 6' "impermissible because it
improperly asked the jury to determine who was lying as the test for deciding
if the appellant was not guilty.' 162 The Northard prosecutor told the jury
"you're going to have to believe that the defendant was telling the truth and
the officer was lying ....,,163 The fourth district noted these type of remarks
"constitute error because they invite the jury 'to convict the defendant for a
reason other than his guilt of the crimes charged.""564
7. References to Witnesses Not Called
In Landry v. State, the prosecutor suggested there was other evidence
, 65
that was not brought to the jury's attention. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal found this to be "clear error, made more egregious by the fact" the
prosecutor's remarks were made to the jury even after the prosecutor's motion
157. Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1965)(citing Tyson v. State, 100 So. 2d
254 (1924)).
158. Id. (citing Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1952)).
159. Id.
160. 675 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
161. In Northard, the prosecutor argued:
If you believe the defendant's events the police cannot possibly be telling you
the truth, and you've got to decide if that's what they did and they got up here
and deliberately fabricated evidence and fabricated testimony for you in order
to convict this guy. In order to find him not guilty you're going to have to
believe that. And that's what your verdict, in order to find him not guilty
you're going to have to believe that the defendant was telling the truth and
the officer was lying strictly about the twenty-dollar bill because there's really
not much else.
Id. at 653.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Bass v. State, 547 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1989)).
165. 620 So. 2d 1099, 1101-1102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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to allow him to comment on the excluded evidence had been denied.1 66 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal stated: "There are few errors which could
fundamentally affect a jury verdict in a criminal trial more than a prosecutorial
argument tantamount to 'trust me, there's more evidence here but I can't get it
in because the judge won't let me.' 167
8. Racial Comments
In Perez v. State,168 the defendants, Perez and Rodriguez, were inmates
at the Dade County Jail. They were found guilty of the improper exhibition of
a weapon and aggravated assault on a corrections officer. Although there was
no evidence of a racial factor contributing to an incident in jail, the prosecutor
argued a racial war had divided the inmates, the defendant was part of the
war, and that a defense witness thought along racial lines.169  The Third
District Court of Appeal stated:
It is, of course, highly improper to interject even a reference to, let
alone an accusation of racism which is neither justified by the
evidence nor relevant to the issues into any part of our judicial
system. It is particularly reprehensible when this is done by a
representative of the state in a criminal prosecution.
70
9. Commenting on Defendant's Failure to Produce a Witness
The defendant in D'Annunzio v. State171 was convicted of two counts of
lewd and lascivious assault on a child. 172 Prior to trial, a notice of alibi was
filed by the defense.173 However, at trial, the defense did not call any alibi
witnesses. 174 During closing argument, the prosecutor informed the jury that
the defendant had filed a notice of alibi, said they were going to put witnesses
on the stand, but did not call one witness to testify about the whereabouts of
the defendant at the time of the crime.175 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
166. Id. at 1102.
167. Id.
168. 689 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
169. Id. at 306-07.
170. Id. at 307.
171. 683 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
172. Id. at 152.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 152.
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held a "prosecutor can only comment on the defendant's failure to produce a
witness when the witness knows material facts which are helpful to the
defendant's case and the witness is available and competent to testify.', 176 The
court found there was no evidence establishing the identity of the alibi
witness, and whether he or she was competent, or whether he or she knew
material facts. 1
77
V. INVITED RESPONSE DOCTRINE
This year, in Fryer v. State, the Third District Court of Appeal found the
comments of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Young, to
be particularly instructive:
178
The situation brought before the Court of Appeals was but one
example of an all too common occurrence in criminal trials-the
defense counsel argues improperly, provoking the prosecutor to
respond in kind, and the trial judge takes no corrective action.
Clearly two improper arguments-two apparent wrongs--do not
make for a right result. Nevertheless, a criminal conviction is not
to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments
standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in
context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. To help
resolve this problem, courts have invoked what is sometimes called
the "invited response" or "invited reply" rule. [T]he Court must
consider the probable effect the prosecutor's response would have
on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. In this context,
defense counsel's conduct, as well as the nature of the prosecutor's
response, is relevant. [T]he reviewing court must not only weigh
the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into
account defense counsel's opening salvo. Thus the import of the
evaluation has been that if the prosecutor's remarks were "invited,"
and did no more than respond substantially in order to "right the
scale," such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction.
1 79
The Fryer court reversed the conviction although the defense initiated the
improper comments. As noted in the concurring opinion of Fryer, a
prosecutor must object to improper comments by defense counsel at the time
176. D'Annunzio, 683 So. 2d at 153 (citation omitted).
177. Id.
178. 693 So. 2d 1046, 1048.
179. Id. (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1985)).
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they are made in order for the trial judge to impose timely restrictions on
defense counsel.18 0 "The doctrine of invited comment does not contemplate
that a prosecutor will sit silently while defense counsel pursues an
impermissible line of argument so that he or she can then pursue his or her
own impermissible and highly prejudicial response."181
VI. HARMLESS ERROR RULE
Improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument are subject to
the harmless error rule as provided in section 59.041 of the Florida Statutes:
No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted by
any court of the state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection
of evidence or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure,
unless in the opinion of the court to which application is made,
after an examination of the entire case it shall appear that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice. This section
shall be liberally construed.1
82
Additionally, section 924.33 of the Florida Statutes provides "[n]o judgment
may be reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion, after an
examination of all the appeal papers, that error was committed that injuriously
affected the substantial rights of the appellant. It shall not be presumed that
error injuriously affected the substantial rights of appellant."'8 3
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the harmless error test
"places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that
the error contributed to the conviction.',
84
In King v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida stated the standard of
review is whether the prosecutor's comment was "so prejudicial as to vitiate
the entire trial."' ' In State v. Murray,18 6 the Supreme Court of Florida noted
180. Id. at 1051. (Sorondo, J., concurring specially).
181. Id.
182. FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1995).
183. FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (1995).
184. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)(quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
185. 623 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1993)(citing State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla.
1984)).
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"prosecutorial error alone does not warrant automatic reversal of a conviction
unless the errors involved are so basic to a fair trial that they can never be
treated as harmless.' 8 7
The Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. DiGuilio, advised that the
"harmless error analysis must not become a device whereby the appellate
court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible evidence,
excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that the evidence of
guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the permissible
evidence."' 8 8 The DiGuilio court went further and stated:
Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact that an
error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution's case
may have played a substantial part in the jury's deliberation and
thus contributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have
reached its verdict because of the error without considering other
reasons untainted by error that would have supported the same
result. 189
VII. PRESERVING THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL
The law is clear that "improper prosecutorial comment which does not
constitute fundamental error must be objected to and a motion for mistrial
requested to preserve [the] issue for appeal."'190 When the objection is
overruled, "[t]he objection itself calls the court's attention to the error alleged
to have prejudiced the party making the objection and to the possibility that a
mistrial may be in order."' 19 However, in Pait v. State192 the Supreme Court
of Florida stated:
[W]hen an improper remark to the jury can be said to be so
prejudicial to the rights of an accused that neither rebuke nor
retraction could eradicate its evil influence, then it may be
considered as a ground for reversal despite the absence of an
186. 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1984).
187. Id. at 956.
188. 491 So. 2d 1129, 1136 (Fla. 1986).
189. Id. (quoting People v. Ross, 429 P.2d 606, 621 (1967)(Traynor, C.J. dissenting),
rev'd sub nom. Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968)).
190. Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1986)(citing State v. Cumbie, 380
So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980)).
191. Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 288 (Fla. 1990)(citing Simpson v. State, 418 So.
2d 984, 986 (Fla. 1982)).
192. 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959).
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objection below, or even in the presence of a rebuke by the trial
judge. 193
In Knight v. State, the prosecutor made a variety of improper
comments.19' However, defense counsel failed to object to each of the
impermissible remarks. 195 The Fourth District Court of Appeal observed that
"[w]e recognize that appellant failed to object to several of the prosecutor's
improper comments and only made one objection at the end of the state's
closing. However, this court has held that 'if the improper comments rise to
the level of fundamental error, then multiple objections are not necessary." ' 196
Most recently, in DeFreitas v. State,197 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed although defense counsel failed to object, request a curative
instruction, or move for a mistrial.9" In taking this action, the court stated:
"we 'perceive very few instances where remarks or conduct by an attorney are
of such sinister influence as to constitute reversible error absent objection."" 199
The fourth district found a portion of the prosecutor's closing remarks fell
well within this category when the prosecutor asked the jurors to imagine how
terrifying it would be if a gun with a laser was pointed at their chest by the
defendant. 20 0  Golden rule arguments are improper, the lines are clear and
bright, and they enjoy no safe harbor in the trial of a criminal case.20 '
Additionally, the court found the prosecutor compounded the misconduct
when he compared the DeFreitas case with the "O.J. Simpson" case.20 2 The
fourth district reversed, but stressed defense counsel's duty to object:
"[D]efense counsel has the duty to remain alert to such things in fulfilling his
responsibility to see that his client receives a fair trial. Except in rare
instances where a grievous injustice might result, this court is not inclined to
excuse counsel for his failure in this regard.,
20 3
193. Id. at 385.
194. 672 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
195. Id. at 590-91.
196. Id. at 591 (quoting Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (citing Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
197. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1997).
198. Id. at D2466.
199. Id. (quoting Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc. 668 So. 2d 1016, 1023 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1996)).
200. Id. at D2469 n.7.
201. Id. at D2465.
202. DeFreitas, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at 2465-66.
203. Id. at 2466.
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Finally, it should be noted that in order for a prosecutor to avail himself
of the doctrine of "invited comment" a prosecutor must object to defense
counsel's improper comments at trial. 04
Vi1. DISCIPLINARY ACTION
In State v. Murray, and cases cited therein, the Supreme Court of Florida
suggested disciplinary action20 5 may be appropriate in some cases: "When
there is overzealousness or misconduct on the part of either the prosecutor or
defense lawyer, it is proper for either trial or appellate courts to exercise their
supervisory powers by registering their disapproval, or, in appropriate cases,
referring the matter to The Florida Bar for disciplinary investigation.
'20 6
IX. CONCLUSION
Despite warnings, admonitions, and reversals of convictions by Florida's
appellate courts, prosecutorial misconduct continues, as evidenced by the
Second District Court of Appeal's remarks this year in Weiand v. State:
2 07
The law, as a profession, carries with it not only competency
requirements but also ethical and professional requirements. As a
result, lawyers have an obligation not to present legally correct
arguments but also to present them in a professional manner.
204. Fryer v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
205. Rule 3-7.8(a) provides:
Whenever it shall be made known to any of the judges of the district courts of
appeal or any judge of a circuit court or a county court in this state that a
member of The Florida Bar practicing in any of the courts of the district or
judicial circuit or county has been guilty of any unprofessional act as defined
by these rules, such judge may direct the state attorney for the circuit in which
the alleged offense occurred to make in writing a motion in the name of the
State of Florida to discipline such attorney, setting forth in the motion in the
name of the State of Florida to discipline such attorney, setting forth in the
motion the particular act or acts of conduct for which the attorney is sought to
be disciplined.
FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3-7.8(a) (1997).
206. Murray, 443 So. 2d at 956 (citing Arango w. State, 437 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1983);
Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 372
So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1979)(Alderman, J., concurring specially)).
207. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1707 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 11, 1997).
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Unfortunately, too many lawyers are forgetting their obligation of
professionalism.0 8
It appears prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument will continue in
Florida unless the trial courts recognize closing arguments which are designed
to be inflammatory, as opposed to dramatic, and either grant mistrials, or
proceed with a disciplinary action through The Florida Bar.20 9 Perhaps a
proper deterrent would be to require prosecutors and defense counsel to attend
oral argument when there are issues of prosecutorial misconduct and invited
response.
It is imperative that lawyers be aware of the specific ethical obligation
they assume when they step into the role of an advocate.2 10 "If attorneys do
not recognize improper argument, they should not be in a courtroom."21' All
attorneys should govern themselves by the words of Chief Justice Gerald
Kogan: "[Y]ou can win your cases, you can win the tough ones, but you have
to do it with dignity and with honor .... We are a noble and an honorable
profession."21
2
Candice D. Tobin
208. Id. atD1708.
209. FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-7.8(a).
210. See Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida
Law, 21 NoVA L. REv. 231, 278 (1996).
211. Luce v. State, 642 So. 2d 4, 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
212. Honorable Gerald Kogan, Keynote Address at the Annual Nova Law Review
Banquet March 29, 1996,21 NOVA L. REv. 1, 4 (1996).
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